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The current financial crisis, through its global dimension, resulted in an intensification of 
efforts of specialists to find the best policies for crisis management, on the one hand, and to 
improve the regulatory and supervision framework, on the other hand, both essential 
conditions for restoring the confidence in the financial system. 
The goal of the present study is to build a bridge among these recent studies and other 
approaches, older or newer, on the role of central bank in ensuring financial stability. 
More concrete, the goal of our scientific approach is to determine, based on empirical 
analysis, if there is a relationship of dependency between the costs of systemic crises and 
central bank independence, an issue, otherwise, little explored in literature. 
In other words, we will try to answer the question: Do central banks with higher degree of 
independence manage systemic crises more effectively than with lower level of 
independence? At first glance, the answer would be that central banks with higher degree 
of independence are able to manage more efficiently systemic crises. The results of the 
empirical analysis based on a sample of 40 systemic crises, however, led us to another 
conclusion, namely those central banks with higher degree of independence showed a poor 
performance in reducing the costs and duration of the crisis, but managed to maintain lower 
inflation rates during these periods. 
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Introduction  
In the literature, there are many approaches to the concept of systemic crisis. Most of them 
consider that a crisis is systemic when problems arising at a bank or more are serious 
enough to have a significant impact on the entire economy - whether it is the payment 
system disruption, massive drop in credit flow, asset values collapse, the deterioration of 
macroeconomic indicators or economic growth interruption (Bogza, 2007, p. 68). 
For the purpose of this study, however, we operate with the definition given by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008a, p. 5), which was used by other authors too (Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper, 
2009, p. 9; Detragiache and Giang Ho, 2010). According to them, a systemic crisis is an 
event where: 
“a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and 
financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As 
a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking 
system capital is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices 
... sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In 
some cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a 
general realization that systemically important financial institutions are in distress”. 
Given the costs induced by a systemic crisis, some authors have been concerned with the 
study of their pathology, closely related to the factors associated with them, and the 
economic, fiscal, and social costs involved.  
Other authors turned their attention to crisis management strategies, trying to identify the 
most effective of them. Although analysis regarding the efficiency of different crisis 
management policies in shortening the duration of the crisis and reducing adverse effects 
are few, they may nevertheless constitute a starting point for more sophisticated studies. 
Thus, Laeven and Valencia (2008a) developed a comprehensive database on policies used 
to stabilize the banking sector during systemic crisis between 1970 and 2007. The authors 
found, based on partial correlations analysis, that certain crisis management policies are 
more effective than other policies in restoring the viability of the financial system. The 
same authors (2008a, p. 6-20) prove, through empirical analysis, that policies such as 
liquidity support, government guarantees for certain financial institutions and forbearance 
from prudential regulations are very costly and do not accelerate economic recovery 
process. Instead, the introduction of a blanket guarantee on all deposits can restore, in their 
view, the confidence of depositors in the banking sector, but not the confidence of external 
creditors (2008b). Also, the authors show that bank closures and the establishment of asset 
management agencies are positively correlated with increasing non-performing loans and 
high fiscal costs, confirming the results obtained by Klingelbiel (2000, p. 30). 
Regarding the institutional framework necessary for an effective systemic crises 
management, Laeven and Valencia (2008a, p.4-14) show that institutional weaknesses 
related to accounting and transparency standards, bankruptcy proceedings, creditors' rights 
and the judiciary system deepen the crisis and complicate the recovery of the economy. In 
this regard, policy makers in countries with weak institutions should take into account that 
they cannot expect similar results to those obtained by developed countries in restructuring AE  Systemic Crisis Management and Central Bank Independence.  
An Empirical Analysis 
 
Amfiteatru Economic  596 
and that there is a need to design recovery mechanisms and an appropriate institutional 
framework. 
At the same time, in a study on the involvement of central banks in crises in Latin America, 
Luiz Jacome (2008) shows that an effective crisis management must be based on four main 
pillars: taking early corrective action; the existence of effective tools for restructuring and 
recovery of banks; the deposit insurance system; central bank’s quality of lender of last 
resort. 
Since central banks have a role, explicitly or inherently
1, in maintaining financial stability 
and in managing systemic crisis, we believe it is useful to study institutional factors that 
may influence decisions and the use of certain instruments in this process. In this study, we 
focus on central bank independence. 
On this issue, the first problem to be addressed is how to measure central bank 
independence. A first measure is the degree to which regulations in a given state grant the 
central bank freedom in setting its goals, this measure being often referred to as legal or 
political independence. It consists of examining the influence of government in appointing 
the central bank’s Governor and Board, the duration of their mandate, the final objectives, 
and other legal characteristics of the central bank
2. 
Another aspect to be considered in measuring central bank independence, analyzed by 
Grill, Masciardano and Tabellini, is economic independence, which represents the central 
bank freedom to choose its monetary policy and the instruments considered 
appropriate.Thus, economic independence refers to the instruments controlled by the 
central bank as the monetary interest rate, banking supervision, the possibility of the 
government to borrow from the central bank and the interest on which these loans are 
granted. 
The issue of central bank independence has also been studied by Debelle and Fischer 
(1994), the authors considering useful the distinction between goal independence - which is 
the central bank freedom to set its final goals - and instrumental independence - that is the 
freedom to choose the appropriate tools for achieving the objectives. 
Traditional indexes of central bank independence are built based on the political and 
economic independence. Thus, the GMT index is built based on 15 criteria, each marked 
with 0 or 1, the index final value being given by the sum of marks for each criterion, and its 
high values indicating a high degree of central bank independence. Instead, Cukierman 
index is based on the evaluation of 16 criteria of political and economic independence, each 
marked by a continuous interval between 0 and 1, the final value of the index being a 
weighted average for each criterion, and its high values indicating a high degree of central 
bank independence.  
Table no. 1 presents the values of Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) index, calculated 
by Polillo and Guillén (2005), for countries that experienced periods of systemic crises and 
that were included in the empirical analysis performed in this study. 
 
                                                 
1  although not explicitly mentioned, it often results from the double role of the central bank as 
monetary policy and prudential authority. 
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Table no. 1: Central bank independence index for countries  
that experienced systemic crises 
No. 
Country   Crisis 
date  CBI 
No. 
Country  Crisis 
date  CBI 
1 Argentina    Mar-80  0.4  21 Jamaica  Dec-96    n/a 
2 Argentina  Dec-89  0.4  22 Japan  Nov-97  0.47 
3 Argentina  Jan-95  0.74  23 Korea  Aug-97  0.44 
4 Argentina  Dec-01  0.74  24 Latvia  Apr-95  0.49 
5 Bolivia  Nov-94  0.3  25 Lithuania  Dec-95  0.25 
6 Brazil    Feb-90  0.21  26 Malaysia  Jul-97  0.36 
7 Brazil    Dec-94  0.21  27 Mexico  Dec-94  0.56 
8 Bulgaria  Jan-96  0.55  28 Nicaragua  Aug.00  0.63 
9 Chile  Nov-81  0.77  29 Norway  Oct.91  0.17 
10 Colombia  Jul-82  0.27  30 Paraguay  May-95    n/a 
11 Colombia    Jun-98  0.44  31 Philippines  Jul-97  0.48 
12  Cote d'Ivoire  1988   n/a  32  Russia  Aug-98  0.49 
13 Croatia  Mar-98  0.44  33 Sri  Lanka  1989  n/a   
14 
Czech 
Republic 1996  0.73  34  Sweden  Sept-91  0.29 
15 
Dominican 
Republic   Apr-03  n/a   35  Thailand  Jul-97  n/a  
16 Ecuador  aug.98  n/a    36 Turkey  Nov-00  0.46 
17 Estonia  Nov-92  0.78  37 Ukraine  1998  0.42 
18 Finland  Sep-91  0.28  38 Uruguay  Jan-02  0.54 
19 Ghana  1982  0.31  39 Venezuela  Jan-94  0.63 






















   40 Vietnam 
Oct- 
1997 n/a   
Source: Polillo and Guillén (2005) 
We can observe a high level of central bank independence in countries like Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Chile and Argentina (since 1992), due to the reforms on central bank 
characteristics, undertaken in the 90s in these countries. Central bank independence is low 
in countries such as Brazil, Lithuania, Bolivia and Colombia. 
Regarding the correlation between central bank independence and macroeconomic 
variables, Alesina (1988) showed that in countries where the degree of central bank 
independence is high, the average inflation rates are lower. However, Grilli, Masciardano 
and Tabellini (1991) found a significant negative relationship between central bank legal AE  Systemic Crisis Management and Central Bank Independence.  
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independence and average inflation. Cukierman (1992) obtained similar results for 
industrialized countries but not for developing countries, this asymmetry being attributed to 
the large gap between legal and actual independence in those countries. 
Other authors have investigated the relationship between central bank independence and 
growth rate (Alesina 1993, Eijffinger 1998) and they found no dependency relationship. 
On the other hand, Rogoff (1985) showed that higher central bank independence leads to 
lower inflation, the cost being greater variability of production. Likewise, Debelle and 
Fischer (1994) conclude that countries where central bank independence is high face higher 
costs during disinflation periods.  
Moreover, Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993) found that, in developed 
countries, there is a negative correlation between central bank independence and growth. 
At the same time, Klomp and de Haan (2009) estimated the relationship between central 
bank independence index and an indicator of financial instability that the authors construct 
using factor analysis
3. The results of their analysis indicate a negative, statistically 
significant, relationship between central bank independence and financial instability. 
From this multitude of views in the literature, our goal, in this study, is to discover the 
relationship between the costs of systemic crises and central bank independence on the one 
hand, and between the inflation rate and central bank independence, on the other.  
Given the above-mentioned issues, and considering the fact that central bank independence 
may influence the choice of certain policies or instruments for crisis management, this 
study analyses the relationship between it and the efficiency of systemic crisis 
management. 
Having in view the results of Gregorio (1996), according to which central bank 
independence indices, developed by different authors, are strongly correlated, and their use 
in relation to other variables lead to similar results, in this study we use the central bank 
independence index developed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). 
 
1. Research methodology and data  
To test the relationship between the efficiency of crisis management and the degree of 
central bank independence, we used bi-variation regression models between central bank 
independence index developed by Cukierman (1992) calculated the Polillo and Guillén 
(2005), as independent variable, and the following dependent variables, which measure the 
cost and duration of crisis and which we believe can be used as indicators of crisis 
management efficiency: 
• duration, represents the number of years in which GDP equals or exceeds the value 
it had before the onset of the crisis. The onset of the financial crisis is set according to the 
methodology described by Laeven and Valencia (2008a);  
                                                 
3 the built indicator is a linear combination of several indexes regarding the banking system (changes 
in the assets on liabilities ratio, reserves / assets, equity / assets, non-government credit / GDP), 
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• depth, represents the maximum annual percentage decrease in GDP during the 
financial crisis. Positive values indicate the decrease of GDP and negative values indicate 
GDP growth;  
• average_inflation, represents the average annual inflation rates during the financial 
crisis. 
The calculated values for these variables are presented in Table no. 2: 
Table no. 2: Duration and depth of systemic crisis  
















Argentina 80  7  6,951  300,40 Jamaica  6 1,209  10,95 
Argentina 89  2  7,007  2696,70 Japan  4 2,049  0,35 
Argentina 95  2  2,845  1,76 Korea  2 6,854  5,97 
Argentina 01  4  10,895  6,09 Latvia  2 2,084  21,3 
Bolivia 0  -4,667  7,87 Lithuania  1 -1,23  39,46 
Brazil 90  2  4,168  1712,56 Malaysia  2 7,359  2,77 
Brazil 94  2  -4,22  1070,91 Mexico  2 6,167  20,98 
Bulgaria 7  8,043  175,56 Nicaragua 0 -4,1  9,9 
Chile 5  13,588  21,48 Norway  1 -3,105  3,42 
Colombia 82  0  -0,948  24,5 Paraguay  0 -5,452  13,38 
Colombia 98  4  4,204  11,68 Philippines  2 0,577  7,77 
Cote d'Ivoire  4  -1,09  2,20 Russia  2 5,3  56,70 
Croatia 2  1,503  4,86 Sri  Lanka  0 -4,736  11,56 
Czech 
Republic  3 0,759  9,36 Sweden  4 2,058  4,65 
Dominican 
















   Thailand 6 10,51  2,97 
Ecuador 3  6,299  61,46667 Turkey  2 5,697  54,64 
Estonia 8  1,642  15,3015 Ukraine 4 1,949  18,355 
Finland 6  6,244  2,062167 Uruguay 5 7,051  10,73 
Ghana 5  6,909  43,9412 Venezuela  2 2,35  60,37 





   Vietnam 0 -8,152  3,095 
Source: Own calculations using World Economic Outlook database, 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo [Accessed: 6 January 2010], Laeven and Valencia 
(2008a) to identify the onset of a crisis, Cecchetti (2009) for calculations regarding the 
duration of a crisis. AE  Systemic Crisis Management and Central Bank Independence.  
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As we can observe in the above table, large crisis durations were registered in Argentina 
(1980), Estonia, Bulgaria, Finland and Jamaica. However, large annual decline in GDP 
(depth) were recorded in Chile, Argentina (2001) and Thailand, and the highest annual 
inflation rates during the crisis occurred in Brazil (both in the 1990 crisis and in 1994) and 
Argentina (1989). 
We mention that the analysis is not affected by endogenous problem, specific to studies 
attempting to establish dependencies between policies adopted and the effectiveness of 
crisis management. Thus, unlike crisis management policies, which are often reactions of 
the authorities at various events and depend largely on their nature and seriousness central 
bank independence is a feature that only changes because of reform processes following the 
financial crisis and rarely during their unfolding (Polillo and Guillén, 2005). 
The estimated bi-variation models have the following form: 
i i i e CBI a + = Υ * ,                                                                                                      (1) 
where:  
Yi, is the dependent variable (is, in turn, duration, depth and average_inflation recorded for 
systemic crisis i); 
CBIi, is the index of central bank independence in the country where systemic crisis i 
manifested; 
e, represents the specification error (the effect of variables that were omitted from the 
model). 
After we estimated the coefficients of bi-variation models, we introduced in the regression 
analysis a vector of control variables X. The multivariate models have the following form: 
i i i i e X bj CBI a + + = Υ * *                                                                                           (2) 
The vector X includes the following variables:  
• currency, is a binary variable indicating the presence of a currency crisis in period [t-
1, t+1], where t is the first year of systemic crisis. Currency crisis is defined using the 
methodology described by Leaven and Valencia (2008a). We expect that, in case a   
currency crisis occurs, the recovery process is slower and involves higher costs; 
• depgdp, is the ratio of total deposits in the banking system to GDP, being a measure 
of the importance of the banking sector in the economy. We expect the duration and depth 
of the crisis to be higher in countries with large banking sectors (Laeven et Valencia, 
2008a);  
• w_gppg, is the real GDP growth rate worldwide in the year before the crisis. This 
variable was introduced because we expected the crisis management process to be more 
efficient in terms of duration and cost, when the degree of global economic development is 
high (due to potential foreign investments and other capital flows that can positively 
influence recovery). 
Since the number of observations is small, we prefer not to introduce more variables in the 
regression models. Economic Interferences  AE 
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2. Results 
The results of the regression models are summarized in Table no. 3, where we presented the 
estimated coefficients a
4 and  b in equations (1) and (2), as well as their statistical 
significance (p-value)
5. 















coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value 





























Note: * p-value> 0.05 indicates a statistically insignificant coefficient for a confidence 
level of 95% 
The results of the bi-variation regression models indicate a positive
6 , statistically 
significant
7, relationship between the duration and depth of systemic crises and central bank 
independence index and a negative, statistically significant, relationship, between the 
average inflation during the crisis and central bank independence index.  
Thus, central banks with high independence indices have poor performance in crisis 
management process, embodied in greater decreases in real GDP and greater durations of 
systemic crisis.  
Results of the dependency relationship between indices of central bank independence and 
duration/ depth of crisis remain statistically significant after the introduction of control 
variables in the model (multivariate models). 
At the same time, the coefficients of control variables currency, w_gdpg and depgdp are 
statistically significant in the model with duration as the endogenous variable and have the 
expected signs. Thus, the duration of the crisis is larger when there was a currency crisis in 
period [t-1 t+1], where t is the first year of systemic crisis. This is indicated by the positive 
coefficient of currency variable in the multivariate regression model. The results also 
indicate that the crisis’ duration is shorter when the degree of economic development is 
high, but is larger in economies with high large banking sectors than in those with less 
important banking sectors. 
                                                 
4 regression slope. 
5 we mention that we performed stationary tests on variables and that they can be used in regression 
models. We also verified the linear regression model assumptions on homoschedasticity, correlation 
errors, multiple co-linearity, etc. 
6 since the regression coefficient is positive. 
7 p-value <0.01, indicating a nonzero value of the coefficient, with a 99% confidence. AE  Systemic Crisis Management and Central Bank Independence.  
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In the multivariate model with depth as endogenous variable, only the coefficients for CBI 
and currency variables are statistically significant for a 95% confidence. These coefficients 
are positive, indicating deeper crises in countries where the central bank is more 
independent and where a currency crisis occurred. 
If central banks with high independence indexes fail to reduce the duration and depth of 
crises, we can not say the same thing about inflation. The results of the bi-variation 
regression model indicate a negative, statistically significant, relationship between the 
average annual inflation rates during the crisis and the central bank independence index
8. In 
the multivariate model, the coefficient of CBI variable loses statistical significance, 
indicating that there are inflation forecasting elements more important. 
 
2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to analyze the sensitivity of results to alternative definitions of the efficiency of 
crisis management process, we estimated regression models (Table no.4) using the 
following endogenous variables (used in other studies as indicators of crisis management 
efficiency): 
• outpuloss, represents the GDP decrease, compared to its potential level, calculated 
by extrapolation real GDP from previous years before the crisis (Leaven et Valencia, 
2008a); 
• c_loss, is the sum of the quarterly GDP gap from its maximum level before the 
crisis, calculated for the duration of the crisis and divided to the maximum level of GDP 
before the crisis (Cecchetti, et al., 2009). The maximum is calculated for a period of 4 
quarters preceding the crisis. The difference between the two above-mentioned variables is 
that one is related to maximum level of GDP before the crisis and defines contraction by 
reference to it, and the other is related to potential GDP, in case the crisis would not have 
happened.  
• length, is the number of quarters in which GDP is below the its maximum level 








                                                 
8 extreme values of inflation rates (over 1000%) were eliminated from the analysis because they can 
distort results. At the same time, in the case of inflation rate, we used log data series, negative values 
of this variable being eliminated from the analysis because they can also distort the results, as a 
negative inflation rate is not a favorable economic situation. Economic Interferences  AE 
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Table no. 4: Regression models used to analyze the sensitivity of results 




Model 2  
(endogenous 
variable: c_loss) 







coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value 





























Note: * p-value> 0.05 indicates a statistically insignificant coefficient for a confidence 
level of 95% 
Models estimated using alternative measures of the efficiency of crisis management (in 
terms of cost and duration) lead us to the same results: the regression coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant in all bi-variation models. In the models in which we 
introduced control variables, the coefficient of CBI variable loses statistical significance 
only when the endogenous variable is outputloss. 
 
2.2 Comparing the results with those of other studies  
To check whether results are consistent with those obtained by other researchers, we will 
refer to those obtained by Detragiache and Giang Ho (2010), who built an index of  costly 
policies used for systemic crisis management. High values of this index shows the use of 
crisis management policies involving major financial resources. The authors showed that 
more risky policies (which uses more financial resources) lead to slower economic 
recovery. 
Testing the relation between policy index and central bank independence index, we found a 
positive, statistically significant relation indicating that many independent central banks use 
more expensive crisis management policies thus leading to higher costs of the crisis. (Table 
no. 5) 
Table no. 5: Results of the regression model with the index constructed by 
Detragiache and Giang Ho as endogenous variable  
and central bank independence index as exogenous variable 
endogenous variable: policy index 
(Detragiache and Giang Ho) 
 
Coefficient   p-value 
exogenous variable CBI  2.4845  0.0002 
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Conclusions  
Choosing the appropriate policy and institutional framework for systemic crisis 
management is a major concern in the current economic context, researching the 
characteristics that may influence the effectiveness of systemic crisis management, thus, 
gaining special importance. Therefore, this study underlines, on the one hand, that a high 
degree of central bank independence does not lead to faster economic recovery or to lower 
economic costs. On the other hand, high central bank independence provides, however, 
lower average annual inflation rates during the crisis, because more independent central 
banks pursue their central objective, namely to maintain price stability, leaving a sideline 
other macroeconomic policy objectives. 
Given the above, we consider that, in choosing the appropriate institutional framework for 
effective systemic crisis management, namely granting a certain degree of independence to 
central banks, it should be taken into account, on the one hand, the central bank’s role and 
importance in maintaining price stability and financial stability and, on the other hand, the 
costs, duration and depth of systemic crises, in case they occur. 
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